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New Attack Chain Turns Microsoft 365 Copilot into a One-Click Data Theft Tool

New Attack Chain Turns Microsoft 365 Copilot into a One-Click Data Theft Tool

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Categories: News

Author: Tobias Schottstädt

New Attack Chain Turns Microsoft 365 Copilot into a One-Click Data Theft Tool

A critical vulnerability chain namens SearchLeak within Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise could allow attackers to steal sensitive data from a target's mailbox, OneDrive, or SharePoint account using a specially crafted URL.

The exfiltrated information might include email content (such as access codes or passwords), calendar events and meeting details, documents, and all other content accessible through Copilot Enterprise Search.

Microsoft addressed this vulnerability at the beginning of the month, assigning it the identifier CVE-2026-42824 with a maximum severity rating: critical.

Researchers from Varonis, an enterprise data security company, developed SearchLeak by chaining together three individual flaws. Individually speaking, each of these vulnerabilities was insufficient on its own to enable a meaningful attack.

The combination exploited a parameter-to-prompt injection weakness, an HTML rendering race condition, and a bypass of the Content Security Policy (CSP), which was enabled by Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

In the first stage, the attack exploits a Parameter-to-Prompt (P2P) injection flaw by leveraging how Microsoft 365 Copilot Search accepts the ‘q’ URL parameter for search queries. Unlike regular Copilot, which generates content, Microsoft Copilot Enterprise specifically searches corporate data across emails, meetings, SharePoint files, and OneDrive.

According to Varonis researchers, an attacker can craft a URL instructing Copilot to “search the user's emails, extract the title, and embed it in an image URL.” The victim does not need to input anything; simply clicking a link is enough for Copilot to perform the task.

This mechanism allowed for the creation of a link containing specific instructions for Copilot to execute, such as searching the victim's mailbox and formatting the results in a particular way.

In the second stage, an attacker exploits an HTML rendering race condition. Here, the browser temporarily renders raw HTML before it is wrapped inside ` blocks that are neutralized while Copilot streams its output. This enables malicious HTML containing an ` tag to execute and trigger outbound requests before the sanitization process completes.

The third component of the chain is an SSRF vulnerability within Bing's “Search by Image” feature, which is used to launch a request to fetch an image from the attacker's endpoint. Since Bing performs this request—in this instance, retrieving content that Copilot should analyze—the CSP protection is bypassed.

Source: www.bleepingcomputer.com

Tobias Schottstädt

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Hey 👋 my name is Tobias Schottstädt and I am a full-stack developer. As a security specialist from Kassel I may be able to support you in your project. I look forward to hearing from you! Whether you have questions, suggestions or feedback. |

My main focus is on application development, which I realize mainly with the programming languages PHP and JavaScript, using the frameworks Laravel and Vue.js or Livewire.